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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) has
traditionally regulated telephone services under Title II of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934,' requiring, among other things, that telephone
companies as "common carriers" make their services available to the
general public at reasonable rates.2 Over the last two decades, however,
the FCC has often refrained from imposing Title H or common carrier
regulation when authorizing new services or in reviewing the regulatory
treatment of existing services. The public interest benefits of classifying
services as "private" or "noncommon" carriage are thought to be the
promotion of competition, the satisfaction of customers' demand for
individually tailored offerings, and the avoidance of unnecessary regulatory
costs.' Notable examples of services that the FCC has moved out of
1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 562 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a) (1988).
3. See, e.g., In re Revisions to Part 21 of the Commission's Rules Regarding the
Multipoint Distribution Service, Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 4251 (1987) [hereinafter
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common carrier regulation include enhanced telecommunications services,4
customer premises equipment (CPE),5 inside wiring,6 and satellite trans-
ponders.' The FCC has also taken this approach in other cases, going so
far as to propose that certain long-distance service contracts could be
considered private carriage.'
This private carrier alternative for the long-distance market has
received renewed impetus from two quarters. First, in October 1995, the
FCC found that even the largest interexchange carrier, AT&T, "lacks
market power in the interstate, domestic interexchange market," giving new
currency to this proposal. 9 Second, with passage of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996,10 Congress has created a new legal and policy playing
field based on the presumption that competition, open entry, and market
forces should, when possible, "regulate" the telecommunications industry.
In particular, the new law grants to the FCC the power to forbear from
MMDS Private Carriage Order].
4. See In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 [hereinafter ComputerHFCC
Final Decision], modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980),
aff'd and clarified by Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Consideration, 88
F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d
198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Computer fl].
5. See Computer H Final FCC Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d paras. 160-62, 168-69. The
FCC has defined CPE as "any equipment provided by a common carrier and located on the
premises of a customer, except that the term does not include overvoltage protection equip-
ment, simple inside wiring, intrasystem wiring, coin-operated or other pay telephones, or
multiplexing equipment used for the delivery of multiple channels to a customer." In re
Procedures for Implementing the Detariffing of Customer Premises Equipment and
Enhanced Services (Second Computer Inquiry), Reportand Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 1276, 1278
n.2 (1983).
6. See In re Detariffing the Installation and Maintenance of Inside Wiring, Second
Report and Order, 51 Fed. Reg. 8498, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1143 [hereinafter Inside
Wiring Second Report and Order], modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 FCC
Rcd. 1190 (1986),further modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 1719
(1988).
7. In re Domestic Fixed-Satellite TransponderSales, Memorandum Opinion, Orderand
Authorization, 90 F.C.C.2d 1238, para. 46 (1982) [hereinafter Transponder Sales Order],
aff'd sub nom. Wold Commmunications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
8. In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, paras. 142-52 (1990) [hereinafter JXC Competition
NPRM]. The FCC later found that the record did not support adoption of the private
carriage proposal. In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report
and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, para. 91 & p. n.150 (1991) [hereinafter !XC Competition Or-
der]. See discussion infra in text accompanying notes 160-73.
9. In re Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order
in FCC 95-427, para. 1 (Oct. 23, 1995) [hereinafter AT&T Nondominance Order].
10. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C.).
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enforcing statutory provisions where to do so would be in the public inter-
est." The new law is the first broad and explicit legislative recognition
that competition can provide a basis for rendering statutory requirements
for telecommunications carriers obsolete. Indeed, it admonishes the FCC
in exercising its forbearance authority to determine whether forbearance
from enforcing a provision or regulation will promote competitive market
conditions or enhance competition among providers of telecommunications
services.' The private carrier alternative is consistent with and comple-
mentary to the deregulatory thrust of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
This Article reviews the judicial and FCC precedent defining the scope of
common and private carriage, describes the contract segment of the long-
distance market, and illustrates why at least this segment can and should be
classified as private carriage.
I. THE DEFINITION OF COMMON CARRIAGE UNDER THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT
A. The 1934 Communications Act and Legislative History Pr-
ovide Little Guidance
Since FCC jurisdiction over telecommunications companies depends
importantly on the meaning given "common carriage," it is somewhat
surprising that the Communications Act of 1934 and FCC regulation
provide so little guidance on how to define it. Section 3(h) of the Act
provides only a circular definition:
"Common carrier" or "carrier" means any person engaged as a
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of
energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not
subject to this Chapter; but a person engaged in radio broadcast-
ing shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed
11. Section 401(a) of the Telecommunications Act requires the Commission to forbear
from applying any regulation or statutory provision to a telecommunications carrier, if it
determines that:
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to
ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or
in connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecommunications
service are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably
discriminatory;
(2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the
protection of consumers; and
(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent
with the public interest.
§ 401, 110 Stat. at 128.
12. Id.
[Vol. 48
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a common carrier. 3
While this statutory language contains some limitations on the scope of
common carriage, the definition does not delineate which providers of
interstate or foreign communication 4 for hire by wire or radio are com-
mon carriers. The legislative history is no more informative: A common
carrier was not intended to include "any person if not a common carrier in
the ordinary sense of the term."5 G. Hamilton Loeb's thorough analysis
of the legislative history of the 1934 Communications Act illustrates Con-
gress's concern with monopoly power held by communications carriers.' 6
Loeb's analysis, however, could not clarify what Congress intended by the
term "common carrier."
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 neither disturbs the common
carrier classification nor provides any additional guidance as to its
meaning. In addition, many of the new provisions of the Act apply to
"telecommunications carriers" which are defined to include, with one
minor exception, any provider of "telecommunications services."' 7 A
"telecommunications service," in turn, is defined as "the offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of
users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the
facilities used." 8 As this Article shows, an essential element of common
carriage is the holding out of a service to the public.'9 Thus, it appears
from the definitions of "telecommunications service" and "telecommunica-
13. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1988).
14. The Communications Act applies only where the carrier is engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce. Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 553 F.2d 701 (lst Cir. 1977);
Ward v. Northern Ohio Tel. Co., 300 F.2d 816 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 820
(1962).
15. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934).
16. See G. Hamilton Loeb, The Communications Act Policy Toward Competition: A
Failure to Communicate, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1. In contrast, the Telecommunications Act of
1996 illustrates that Congress is concerned with competition among the nation's telecommu-
nications carriers. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 10. In establishing Part II of
Title II, much of the legislation is devoted to the development of competitive markets. S.
652 § 101. Where the Commission determines that regulation is not necessary to prevent
unjust or unreasonably discriminatory rates or otherwise protect consumers or the public
interest, it shall forbear from applying any regulation or provision of the Act to a
telecommunications carrier. Id. § 401. "If the Commission determines that forbearance will
promote competition, that determination may provide the basis for finding that forbearance
will be in the public interest." Id.
17. § 3, 110 Stat. 60. The exemption is for aggregators of telecommunications services
as defined at 47 U.S.C. § 226 (1988).
18. § 3, 110 Stat. 60. Telecommunications means "the transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the
form or content of the information as sent or received." Id.
19. See infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
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tions carrier" in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that Congress has
extended the common carrier classification and, therefore, the private
carrier distinction, to assist in the identification of entities and services to
be subject to the requirements of the new law.'
The definition of "telecommunications carrier" goes on to state that
"[a] telecommunications carrier" shall be treated as a common carrier
under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommu-
nications services, except that the Commission shall determine whether the
provision of fixed and mobile satellite service shall be treated as "common
carriage." 2 As discussed, "telecommunications service" already includes
the essential element of common carriage-that the carrier holds itself out
as providing the services to the public. ' The additional language in the
definition appears to be restating for "telecommunications carriers" what
is already true under current law for common carriers-that a single entity
may be subject to common carrier regulation in providing some services
but not others.'
The acts preceding the 1934 Communications Act do not shed much
light on the subject. In 1910, the Mann-Elkins Act?' gave the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) jurisdiction over the interstate rates charged
by telephone and telegraph companies. The Mann-Elkins Act was an
addition to an act designed to regulate railroad sleeping car companies and
was not considered major legislation. Little reason was given for this
limited regulatory foray since the ICC could only respond to complaints.
Indeed, it was noted that telephone and telegraph, as monopolies, were the
only remaining public service companies not yet subject to ICC regula-
20. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference (Conference
Statement) for the most part repeats these definitions, except that the report notes that the
House amendment would have specifically included as "telecommunications service[s]"
"those services and facilities offered on a 'common carrier' basis, recognizing the
distinction between common carrier offerings ... and private services." Conference State-
ment, 142 CONG. REc. Hi107 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996). The Conference Statement does
not contain any discussion of Congress's choice of words in creating the enacted definition.
21. § 3, 110 Stat. 60. Again, the Conference Statement does no more than repeat the
definition.
22. See supra p. 451.
23. See infra pp. 455-57. Also, the reference to satellite providers may give the FCC
some additional discretion to refrain from imposing common carrier regulation on satellite
services, even where the satellite providers are offering their service to the public.
24. Commerce Court (Mann-Elkins) Act, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539,
544 (1910) (amending Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379
(1887)) (provisions relating to telegraph, telephone, and cable companies repealed by
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102).
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tion. 5 No abuses were cited.' The lack of regulation by the ICC during
its twenty-five years of regulatory authority may, as Loeb suggests,
evidence a dearth of public sentiment on the subject.'
Ten years later the Esch-Cummins Act" restated the ICC's jurisdic-
tion to include "the transmission of intelligence by wire or wireless."29
Loeb believes this language change was made to bring the statute into con-
formance with the Supreme Court's Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western
Union Telegraph Co." decision." As Loeb points out, "[t]he Committee
made it clear that no change in the regulatory scheme or the regulatory
policy previously applied to communications was contemplated." 32 A year
later, the Willis-Graham Act33 exempted telephone and telegraph mergers
from the antitrust acts and gave the ICC power to approve or disapprove
them.' The debates over this Act evidence the legislators' view that tele-
phony was a natural monopoly.3
In implementing the 1934 Communications Act, the FCC simply
restated the Act's definition of a "communication common carrier" as
"[a]ny person engaged in rendering communication service for hire to the
public."" For most of the Act's history, the ambiguity over what consti-
tuted common carriage did not present any significant difficulties. As to
any particular service, consumers usually had no choice; there was usually
only one provider for any given service. In the long-distance market and
25. 45 CONG. REc. 5533 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Bartlett). See Loeb, supra note 16,
at 7.
26. Loeb, supra note 16, at 7.
27. Id. at 9. Loeb states that only 14 formal rate investigations were begun. Id. at 17
& n.82. Loeb agrees with an earlier review that ICC regulation may well have "relieve[d]
the wire carriers of any effective governmental control in the public interest." Id. at 18
(quoting Note, The Telegraph Industry: Monopoly or Competition, 51 YALE L.J 629, 633
(1942)).
28. Transportation (Esch-Cummins) Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 152, ch. 91, § 400, 41
Stat. 456, 474 (amending Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 544
(1910)), repealedby Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
29. Esch-Cummins Act § 400(b), 41 Stat. at 474.
30. Pensacola Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
31. Loeb, supra note 16, at 11. An earlier version of this legislation that would have
subjected communications companies to full regulation, H.R. REP. No. 456, 66th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11-12 (1919), was strenuously opposed and later dropped. See Loeb, supra note
16, at 10 & n.50 (citing opposition).
32. Loeb, supra note 16, at 10.
33. Willis-Graham Act, Pub. L. No. 15, cl. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921) (amending
Transportation (Esch-Cummins) Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 152, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat.
482), repealed by Communications Act of 1934, cl. 652, § 602(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
34. Id. See Loeb, supra note 16, at 12.
35. See Loeb, supra note 16, at 14.
36. 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1995).
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in each local exchange there was only one telephone company, and all
agreed that it was a common carrier.
The first major crack in this regulatory structure came in 1958 in the
FCC's Above 8907 decision, when the FCC allowed businesses to use
microwave frequencies to meet some of their internal communications
needs.3" This case provided a starting point for MCI to act as a common
carrier by providing "private line" service to businesses.39 Eventually,
with guidance from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,' the FCC
permitted MCI and others to offer switched service to the general
public.4 The rest is history.42 By the first quarter of 1995, AT&T's
share had fallen from 100 percent to 56.6 percent, MCI and Sprint had gar-
nered 17.7 percent and 8.7 percent of the market, and scores of other carri-
ers had constituted a significant fringe that supplied 17 percent of the total
long-distance market.43
The FCC extended the concept of allowing third-party carriage of
private line services in 1975, when it created a new service called special-
ized mobile radio service (SMRS). 4 SMRS licensees are third-party pro-
37. In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc, Report and Order, 27
F.C.C. 359 (1959) [hereinafter Above 890 Order].
38. Id. paras. 6, 20-24.
39. The FCC has defined private line service as "a service whereby facilities for
communication between two or more designated points are set aside for the exclusive use
or availability for use of a particular customer and authorized users during stated periods
of time." 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1995) (relating to domestic public fixed radio services).
40. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter
Execunet], cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
41. See, e.g., In re MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental
Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, 81 F.C.C.2d 177 (1980); In re MTS and
WATS Market Structure, Third Report and Order, 93 F.C.C.2d 241, modified by
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (1983), modified by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 834 (1984), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom.,
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
42. For a history of the development of competition in the long-distance market, see
MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 585-622 (1992).
Even before the Above 890 Order, the FCC departed from the traditional common
carrier paradigm in structuring private and common carrier mobile radio services. Because
user-owned radio communications systems did not afford the same economies of scale as
wire-based telephony, the FCC licensed first private licensees and then competing common
carrier licensees. See, e.g., GEORGE CALHOUN, DIGITAL CELLuL.AR RADIO 35 (1988). In
1949, the FCC licensed competing mobile common carriers called radio common carriers.
In re General Mobile Radio Serv., Report and Order, 13 F.C.C. 1190 (1949).
43. See FCC, CC, LONG DISTANCE MARKET SHARE 14 (1995) (based on toll revenues).
44. In re An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 51 F.C.C.2d 945, paras. 36-39 (1975) [hereinafter Land
Mobile Service 1975 Order], aff'd sub nom., National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs
v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.) [hereinafter NARUC 1], cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992
[Vol. 48
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viders of mobile communications who, at the time the service began, were
restricted to serving the internal business communications needs of eligible
businesses.4' In FCC parlance, they were restricted to serving those
entities eligible to become private radio licensees.' This distinction, the
FCC reasoned, made SMRS licensees private rather than common
carriers. 47
The FCC's decision to create SMRS was challenged in court by the
radio common carriers on the grounds that SMRS would be engaged in
common carriage and, therefore, would have to be regulated as common
carriers.4 Judge Wilkey's opinion in NARUC I filled the statutory and
regulatory gap and remains the leading case regarding the definition of
communications common carriers.
B. The NARUC I Test for Common Carriage
Finding the statutory and FCC definitions of common carriage
(1976).
45. Land Mobile Service 1975 Order, 51 F.C.C.2d 945, 993 (Appendix B).
46. Id. para. 36.
47. See id. para. 43. It is noteworthy that the impetus for this hybrid came, in part,
from bureaucratic impulses regarding the allocation of spectrum between private radio and
common carrier bureaus as well as from the desire to provide an unregulated third-party
provider of mobile communications to business services. See, e.g., In re An Inquiry Rela-
tive to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz, Second Report and Order, 46
F.C.C.2d 752 at 762, paras. 28-30, 45-48 (1974); In re An Inquiry Relative to the Future
Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 55 F.C.C.2d
771, para. 7 (1975) (proceeding terminated).
48. If SMRS was considered common carriage, the FCC would have been required to
regulate SMRS carriers under Title I[ of the Communications Act of 1934, including
requiring tariff filings. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C.
Cir. 1994). See also MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2223, 2231-33
(1994) (striking down the FCC's permissive detariffing rules); Southwestern Bell Corp. v.
FCC, 43 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that FCC rules allowing nondominant inter-
exchange carriers to file a range of rates, rather than fixed rate tariffs, violated 47 U.S.C.
§ 203); American Tel. & Tel. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (striking down
FCC's forbearance policy), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993). The FCC has amended
its policies to require tariffs to illustrate a fixed rate but has continued streamlined
regulation for nondominant carriers in other respects. In re Tariff Filing Requirements for
Nondominant Common Carriers, Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 13,653, para. 2 (1995). The FCC
is again considering reinstating something substantially similar to its previous forbearance
policies in light of its authority under § 401 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See
In re Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace Implementation
of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
in CC Dkt. 96-61, FCC 96-123 (Mar. 25, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Detarifflng NPRM].
The regime established by the FCC for SMRS included an additional important
competitive development-preemption of state entry regulation. LandMobile Service 1975
Order, 51 F.C.C.2d para. 87. This precluded established common carriers from using state
regulation to thwart start-up SMRS competitors.
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unhelpful, Judge Wilkey consulted the common law.49 He noted that the
doctrine of common carriage developed at common law in England to
"impose a greater standard of care upon carriers who held themselves out
as offering to serve the public in general."" The imposition of the status
of insurer on the carrier had been based on the lack of control exercised by
travellers and shippers and the resulting potential for carriers to fraudu-
lently claim losses due to theft or negligence.5
In contrast, legislation enacted in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries included price and service regulation as well as
"insurer" obligations. Concern over the monopoly power of railroads led
to regulation designed to assure reasonable pricing and access.52 As
discussed above, the same concern led to the imposition of common carrier
regulation on telephone and telegraph companies.53 Subsequently, and
confusingly, legislation extended common carrier regulation to carriers
without monopoly power in competitive industries such as trucking.'
Judge Wilkey attempted to harmonize these divergent theories by
emphasizing an element common to all of these industries-the common
carrier's practice of holding itself out to serve the public indiscriminately.
He concluded that "what appears to be essential to the quasi-public
character implicit in the common carrier concept is that the carrier
'undertakes to carry for all people indifferently. . . ., A carrier is not
a common carrier if its practice is to make individualized deals.56
By itself this criterion could be insufficient because carriers with
substantial market power might seek to price-discriminate among consum-
ers to maximize their profits.' Judge Wilkey added a second criterion: a
49. NARUC , 525 F.2d 630, 640 (1976). The Supreme Court also noted the circularity
of the statutory definition in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 702 n.10 (1979).
50. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 640.
51. For a discussion of the development of common carrier duties, see Note, Redefining
"Common Carrier": The FCC's Attempt at Deregulation by Definition, 1987 DUKE L.J.
501, 506-11 (1987). This note focuses on the implied-contract aspects of common carriage.
As the note points out, many early decisions were reluctant to call telephone companies
common carriers, even when the courts were willing to subject them to similar duties. See
id. at 508-09 (citing cases and commentary).
52. See NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at 640. Cf. supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
54. See Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 3, 96 Stat. 2418, 2425 (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301, 327 (1989)).
55. NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at 641 (quoting Semon v. Royal Indem. Co., 279 F.2d 737,
739 (5th Cir. 1960)).
56. Id.
57. The effects of such price discrimination on income distribution, efficiency, and
competition are complicated; under certain conditions it could increase efficiency while
effecting undesirable wealth transfers. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUS-
[Vol. 48
THE PRIVATE CARRIER ALTERNATIVE
carrier may not choose to make individualized deals if the FCC, or other
agency or legislation, compels it to behave as a common carrier.5 s The
FCC had concluded that SMRS providers need not act as common carriers
because competition was the best means of achieving efficient use of the
spectrum in question. 9 In applying the public interest test in NARUC I,
Judge Wilkey found this conclusion to be rational.'
Thus, a carrier offering communications service is acting as a
common carrier if it either (1) actually holds out its service indiscriminately
to the public or (2) is required to hold itself out because the public interest
requires it. As to the former criterion, the NARUC I court stated that the
fact that SMRS is of practical use to only a fraction of the population was
not an obstacle to common carrier status.6" However, Judge Wilkey found
that:
* The nature of dispatch services necessarily means that SMRS will
establish medium- to long-term relations with a clientele that will
remain relatively stable.62
* Methods of operation and time demands may be highly individualized
and may be a very sound basis for a carrier to accept or reject an
applicant. For example, different systems might be better suited to
different users depending upon their hours of primary need.63
* Nothing in the record indicates any significant likelihood that SMRS
providers will hold themselves out indifferently to serve the user
public.'
Because the SMRS providers did not appear likely to hold themselves out
by virtue of the industry structure, and because the FCC was not required
by statute or under the public interest test to force SMRS providers to hold
themselves out, Judge Wilkey did not disturb the FCC's decision not to
regulate SMRS providers as common carriers.
C. Three Criteria Related to Common Carriage Have Been
Rejected
A number of cases clarify that various typical features of common
TRIAL MARKEr STRUCTURE AND EcoNoMIcPERFORMANCE 494-501 (1990). Of course, the
purported evils associated with such price discrimination may be no worse than the anti-
competitive harms caused by regulatory oversight.
58. See NARUC , 525 F.2d at 642-43.
59. See Land Mobile Service 1975 Order, 51 F.C.C.2d 945, paras. 70-78 (1975).
60. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 646.
61. Id. at 642.
62. Id. at 643.
63. Id. at 643 n.73.
64. Id. at 644.
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carriage are not sufficient to make one a common carrier. First, while the
holding-out test has been held to require implicitly that the carrier's service
permits subscribers to transmit intelligence of their own choosing,' lack
of control over content does not by itself make one a common carrier. In
Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC,' the D.C. Circuit rejected the con-
tention that domestic satellite operators' lack of control over content on the
transponders they sell made them common carriers.67 Instead, the court
relied on the adequacy of the FCC's record that satellite operators would
be unlikely to hold themselves out to the public when selling satellite
transponders.6"
Second, earning a profit does not make one a common carrier.
NARUC I concluded that such a broad reading of the definition would
impermissibly sweep in services that the courts have emphatically
excluded.69 However, the FCC is not precluded from considering profit
altogether. In American Telephone & Telegraph v. FCC,7" the Second Cir-
cuit rejected the contention that resellers of other common carriers' facil-
ities are not common carriers because they do not communicate by wire or
radio.7 The court found it proper for the FCC to distinguish between not-
for-profit shared telecommunications systems and for-profit resellers.Y It
noted that profit can be a "significant indicium" of common carriage
insofar as its existence increases the likelihood that the party making the
profit is indiscriminately holding itself out. 3 The court stated, "[t]he FCC
has not altered the statutory requirements, it has merely articulated criteria
to which it will look to determine whether the statutory requirements are
met."74 However, the court dismissed "[t]he suggestion by petitioners that
the FCC has made profit a test of common carriage."'
65. Frontier Brdcst. Co. v. Collier, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C. 251
(1958).
66. Wold Communications, Inc., 735 F.2d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 1471 n.10.
68. Id. The Wold Communications court also observed that NARUC I determined that
the operators of SMRS, who exercised no control over the content of the messages con-
veyed, were not common carriers. Id. (citing NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at 642-45).
69. NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at 641 (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Riddell, 252 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1958); Ciaccio v. New Orleans Public Belt R.R., 285 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. La. 1968)).
70. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
875 (1978).
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 27.
75. Id. While not requiring a "profit" test, the definition of telecommunications service
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is limited to carriers offering service for a fee.
§ 3, 110 Stat. 60. Telecommunications carriers would not be subject to common carrier
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While it is permissible for the FCC to consider whether a carrier
profits from its carriage in deciding whether the carrier is a common
carrier, a profit guideline is not required by the Communications Act, and
the FCC has long since discarded it as an indicium of indiscriminate
holding out.76
Third, it is not essential that a carrier own facilities. In rejecting
IBM's contention that resellers could not be common carriers because they
do not own facilities, the AT&T court acknowledged that it owed deference
to the FCC's interpretation that a common carrier is one who holds out
regardless of actual ownership of facilities.77 After observing various
weaknesses in IBM's argument, the court concluded that there was "no
persuasive reason to depart from the FCC's long-standing interpretation of
its own organic statute."' A strong presumption of validity ran with the
FCC's interpretation.79
D. The NARUC I Test Has Been Broadly Applied to New and
Existing Services
1. Court Precedent
On numerous occasions, the courts and the FCC have relied on and
broadly applied NARUC 's two-part test. The Supreme Court quoted the
NARUC I test approvingly in Midwest Video.' In that case, the Court
regulation to the extent that they did not provide a service for a fee. See Id.
76. See, e.g., MMDS Private Carriage Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 4251, para. 8 (1987); In re
Norlight Request for Declaratory Ruling, Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd. 132, recon-
sidered, 2 FCC Rcd. 5167 (1987) [hereinafter Norlight Declaratory Ruling].
77. American TeL & Tel. Co., 572 F.2d at 25.
78. Id.
79. Id. The court also deferred to the FCC, affirming its finding that shared users were
not common carriers. In this instance, the court found that the FCC did not "manipulate the
definition of common carrier in such a way to achieve pre-determined regulatory goals."
Id. at 26. The court found no error in the FCC's conclusion that sharing among partici-
pants, each of whom had a communications need, other than a need to resell the service to
others, was unlikely to constitute an undertaking to serve the public indiscriminately for
hire. Id. As already noted, the court found the FCC's use of criteria such as profit to assist
in its determination to be proper. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. Also, the
court rejected an intervenor's contention that the FCC erred in failing to limit sharing to
entities in the same line of business. The court stated that the decision to impose such limi-
tations is left to the FCC's discretion. Id. at 27. While the proposed limitation might have
been fair and reasonable, the Second Circuit found that the FCC is free to select other fair
and reasonable alternatives. Id.
80. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979). The Supreme Court also
quoted a 1966 FCC decision, In re Amendment of Parts 2, 91 and 99 of the Commission's
Rules Insofar as They Relate to the Industrial Radiolocation Service, Report and Order, 5
F.C.C.2d 197 (1966) [hereinafterIndus. Radiolocation Serv. Order], which employed essen-
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struck down an FCC requirement that certain cable systems hold out
dedicated channels on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis because it
would have imposed common carrier regulation in contravention of Section
3(h)'s prohibition against imposing common carrier regulation on radio
broadcasting. 81
While the FCC does not have unfettered discretion in defining
common carriage, the leading precedent' has shown substantial deference
to the FCC's attempts to apply this two-part test. The tone was set in
NARUC L In rejecting those parts of the FCC's decision that implied "an
unfettered discretion ... to confer or not confer common carrier status on
a given entity, depending on the regulatory goals it seeks to achieve, " '
the court stated that "in authorizing the creation of SMRs which are not re-
quired to behave and thus be regulated as common carriers, the FCC has
[not] breached the broad discretion granted it with regard to radio under the
tially the same test. The Court noted that a common carrier service in the communications
context is one that "makes a public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby
all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or
transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing . . . ." Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at
701 (quoting Indus. Radiolocation Serv Order., 5 F.C.C.2d para. 19).
81. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 701. In a cable TV classification case that predates
NARUCI, Philadelphia TV Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the D.C.
Circuit upheld the FCC's decision, at that time, not to regulate cable systems as common
carriers. In agreeing with the FCC's position that the regulation of cable systems as adjuncts
to broadcasting was more appropriate than imposing common carriage obligations, the court
stated, it showed:
great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration. "To sustain the Commission's
application of this statutory term, we need not find its construction is the
only reasonable one or even that it is the result we would have reached had
the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings."
Id. at 283-84 (citations omitted) (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)). This
is especially true where the statute and legislative history are, at best, unhelpful on the ques-
tion involved, and Congress could not have reasonably anticipated the nature and variety
of methods of communication by wire and radio that would have come into existence since
1934. Id.
82. The leading precedent in this area is NARUC 1, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976), discussed at supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text. Two
other D.C. Circuit cases, Computer II and WoM Communications, Inc. v. FCC also
established precedent. Computer II, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), discussion infra notes
86-96 and accompanying text, and Wold, 735 F.2d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984), discussion infra
notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
83. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 644. ("A particular system is a common carrier by virtue
of its functions, rather than because it is declared to be so.") The court also applied a defer-
ential standard in judging the Commission's conclusion that a competitive environment will
best achieve its goals: "The 1975 Order reveals an in-depth consideration of the effects of
such a competitive approach so that we cannot say that the FCC may not have 'given
reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors.'" Id. at 645 (footnotes omitted).
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'public convenience, interest and necessity' standard." 84
The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's Computer H decision," which,
in terms of economic impact, was the Commission's most significant
removal of services from common carrier regulation. In Computer II, the
D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's decision defining enhanced services and
CPE as noncommon carriage.' The court afforded the FCC considerable
leeway in determining that the FCC was not required to classify enhanced
services as common carrier services.' The FCC determined that its obli-
gation to promote an efficient network could best be accomplished by regu-
lating the rates of only those activities clearly within the scope of Title
H.8 The court noted the difficulties the FCC had in drawing the demar-
cation line in the data services area on a case-by-case basis.8 9 The court
concluded that in these circumstances the FCC was "justified in conserving
its energies for more efficacious undertakings, at least when it establishes
an alternative regulatory scheme under its ancillary jurisdiction. "I
Importantly, having already upheld the FCC's finding that a provision
of CPE is not itself a common carrier activity within Title II,11 the court
stated that "the Commission could regulate the rates for carrier-provided
CPE only if it were necessary to ensure the availability of Title H-regulated
communications service at reasonable rates."92 Congress did not require
the FCC to regulate carrier-provided CPE under Title II when it had
"determined that an alternative regulatory scheme would more effectively
further the goals of the [Communications] Act."I
Computer II concluded that an alternative regulatory scheme that
relied on the "regulatory tools" of "newly unleashed market forces"
provides a sufficient basis for classifying an activity as noncommon car-
84. Id. at 645.
85. Computer H FCC Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980); In re Amendment of
Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry),
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980); In re Amendment of Section
64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), aff'd sub
nom, Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
86. Computer H, 693 F.2d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 206-14.
88. See, e.g., Computer f FCC Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d, paras. 119, 129-132.




93. Id. at 211-12. The court upheld the requirement that AT&T provide CPE only
through a separate subsidiary.
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riage.9 In finding that the FCC acted reasonably in defining its juris-
diction over enhanced services and CPE, the court stated: "Because the
Commission's judgement on 'how the public interest is best served is
entitled to substantial judicial deference,' the Commission's choice of regu-
latory tools in Computer II must be upheld unless arbitrary or capri-
cious. " ' The economic importance of Computer II, however, was impor-
tant to the court and arguably limits its precedential weight in other
areas.
96
The other leading case, Wobld Communications, presented the D.C.
Circuit with more difficult facts.' The FCC had ruled that satellite
operators could sell some of the transponders on their satellites rather than
lease them under a common carrier tariff.98 Also, at the time of the
decision allowing transponder sales, domestic satellite providers were
regulated as dominant carriers. 99
The Wld Communications court observed at the outset that it was
confronting "arcane, fast-moving" technology, divergent estimates of
supply and demand, and a lack of specific congressional guidance concern-
ing satellite regulation."t0 These circumstances compelled the court to pay
"particular deference to the expert agency's [FCC's] policy judgments [sic]
and predictions [and] its forecasts of 'the direction in which future public
94. Id. at 212 (citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 674 F.2d 160, 166-67 (2d Cir.
1982)). In winding up its analysis, the court quoted earlier cases that described Congress's
intent to endow the Commission with sufficiently elastic powers such that it could readily
accommodate dynamic new developments in the field of communications. See id. at 213
(citing General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 853 (5th Cir. 1971); National
Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 922 (1970); General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 290, 298 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 888 (1969)).
95. Id. at 214 (quoting FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981))
(citations omitted).
96. Computer II may be regarded as somewhat of an "outlier" in terms of the amount
of discretion allowed the FCC. For example, it is difficult to imagine that the provision of
voice mail by the telephone company to residential customers would be consistently done
on an individually negotiated basis.
97. Because transponders require significant overhead in satellite construction and
launch costs, this case raises difficult questions regarding, inter alia, the allocation of those
joint and common costs. See infra pp. 463-464.
98. Transponder Sales Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 1238 (1982), aff'd sub nom., Wold
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
99. See Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The FCC eventually relaxed rate regulation for domestic satellites. See In re Policy and
Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Autho-
rized Therefor, Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 568 n.48 (1983).
100. Wold Communications, Inc., 735 F.2d at 1468.
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interest lies.'" '° The court saw two questions-whether the FCC's
decision was within its "broad range" of authority under the Communica-
tions Act, and whether the decision was adopted through a rational
decision-making process."
In answering the first question, the court rejected the contention that
the FCC must regulate domestic satellite operators exclusively as common
carriers even if the FCC has rationally found that the public interest would
be advanced by allowing the marketplace to substitute for direct FCC
regulation." Given the elastic regulatory powers that Congress gave to
the FCC, in "a field of enterprise the dominant characteristic of which was
the rapid pace of its unfolding," the court concluded that "beyond question
the Act permits the FCC to allow the marketplace to substitute for direct
FCC regulation in appropriate circumstances."'" The court found that the
FCC's essential public interest determinations and its measured step made
its reliance on market forces appropriate.'05
In answering the second question, "mindful of its limited role,""°
the court found record support for the FCC's forecasts.'07 The court
admonished the petitioners for selecting the wrong forum for complaining
that the FCC's decision was "unwise."108
Reviewing courts have accorded the FCC substantial deference in
determining whether a carrier is holding itself out and whether it should be
required to hold itself out. The FCC must demonstrate that its decision is
within its broad discretion and the product of reasoned decision making.
Also, when it allows carriers to engage in noncommon carriage where
previously common carriage reigned alone, the FCC has to demonstrate
adequately that such increased reliance on market forces is appropriate and
that it is moving in a measured manner. While there are certainly limits to
the FCC's discretion in deregulating industries or industry participants,0 9
the FCC is not without substantial breathing room to rely on deregulation
101. Id. (quoting FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 595 (1981) (quoting
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978))).
102. Id. at 1474.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1475 (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1478. See also id. at 1477 (citing National Brdcst. Co., Inc. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943)).
107. Id. at 1477-79.
108. Id. at 1479 (quoting National Brdcst. Co., 319 U.S. at 224).
109. See supra note 48 (discussing constraints on the FCC's ability to relax regulation
of nondominant carriers). Section 401(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
substantially expands the Commission's authority to exempt carriers from stautory
requirements upon specific findings. See supra note 11.
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and competition to serve the public interest.
2. FCC Precedent
The FCC has applied the NARUC I test in numerous decisions not
receiving court review. When defining common carriage, the FCC has
rarely strayed from NARUC I, except to argue for an even more narrow
interpretation of the holding-out criteria. Without exception, the FCC has
used the presence of competition as the primary basis for concluding that
a particular service need not be held out indiscriminately to the public.
FCC initiatives reclassifying services as private or noncommon carriage fall
into five categories: (1) satellite transponders, (2) broadcast-related
services, (3) private land mobile services, (4) private microwave services,
and (5) certain communications services, such as enhanced services, CPE,
and inside wiring.
a. Satellite Transponder Sales
Recognizing the significant departure from previous practice involved
in authorizing transponder sales,1 the FCC emphasized the public policy
considerations underlying its decision."' The FCC found that allowing
the sale of satellite transponders would encourage additional satellite entry
and facility investment, allow for more efficient use of orbital slots and of
the radio spectrum, and spur technical and marketing innovation in the
provision of domestic satellite service." 2 The FCC also agreed with the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission that domestic
satellite licensees did not possess market power."'
Initially, the FCC required applicants that wanted to designate
transponders for noncommon carriage to include detailed showings on such
things as the percentage of noncommon carriage transponders, the nature
and principal terms of these offerings when provided to other parties, the
number of transponders, and the name of the purchasing parties."4 In
order for it to determine whether satellite operators were in fact engaging
in common carriage by indiscriminately holding out the transponders avail-
able for sale, the FCC also required applicants to submit marketing
110. Transponder Sales Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 1238, para. 23 (1982).
111. Id. paras. 28-45.
112. Id. para. 34.
113. Id. para. 39. The FCC limited its finding of no market power solely to the purpose
of determining whether noncommon carrier regulation was permissible under NARUC I, as
the FCC still considered domestic satellite carriers dominant, at least insofar as their
common carriage offerings were concerned. Id. at 1254 n.38.
114. See id. para. 55.
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plans. 115
Four years after the Transponder Sales Order, the FCC significantly
relaxed this case-by-case review."' The FCC granted Martin Marietta
authority to provide domestic satellite service, but, due to its deficient
provision of information, the FCC denied Martin Marietta the ability to
operate on anything other than a common carrier basis.1 7 Martin
Marietta filed a Request for Modification of its authorization, and although
the FCC again found the information provided by Martin Marietta to be
lacking, it nonetheless approved Marietta's request to sell or lease 33
percent of its transponders."'
The FCC determined that it no longer needed the detailed showings
required by Transponder Sales Order."9 Instead, an applicant need only
show that its noncommon carrier proposal would "not unduly reduce the
availability of satellite transponders offered on a common carrier ba-
sis."" The FCC stated that its continued monitoring, coupled with its
findings in the intervening Competitive Carrier proceeding'2 ' of no mar-
ket power in the domestic satellite market, provide a sufficient rationale for
making such authorizations more routine. 1'2
The FCC's transponder decisions are also important for having
permitted satellite operators to offer on a private carrier basis, transponders
that share overhead costs with other transponders offered under tariff.
Hundreds of millions of dollars are required to cover the launch costs,
insurance premiums, construction expenses, and other joint and common
costs incurred to provide a satellite's transponders. Nonetheless, since
Martin Marietta, the FCC has granted numerous applications allowing
operators to provide domestic fixed satellite transponders on a noncommon
carrier basis while the remaining transponders on the satellite are offered
under tariff." Operators have attested that they are unaware of any
115. Id.
116. See In re Martin Marietta Comm. System, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 779 (1986).
117. See id. para. 1. Martin Marietta had addressed each of the information requirements
required by Transponder Sales Order, but its filing was "vague." See id. para. 6.
118. Id. para. 12.
119. Id. para. 6.
120. Id.
121. Id. paras. 8-9.
122. Id. para. 11.
123. See, e.g., Letter from Cecily C. Holiday, FCC, to Leslie A. Taylor, GTE Spacenet
Corp. (Mar. 31, 1987) (granting "systemwide" transponder sales authority for up to 80 of
its 136 then-authorized transponders); Letter from Chief, Domestic Facilities Division,
FCC, to Carl J. Cangelosi, GE American Communication, Inc. (Nov. 21, 1989)
(authorizing transponder sales authority for 12 of 24 transponders on Satcom HR); Letter
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instances subsequent to the Transponder Sales Order where a grant of
noncommon carrier authority has been found to impact the public interest
adversely, and that the practice has worked well in allowing them to meet
customer needs in the competitive satellite market. 24
b. Mass Media Services
The FCC followed this transponder sale approach in liberalizing
regulation of the Microwave Multipoint Distribution Service (MMDS).
Applying the NARUC I test, the FCC concluded that MMDS licensees
could, at their election, designate some or all of their channels for
noncommon carrier service, while providing common carrier service on
other channels."z Relying on its favorable experience with transponder
sales, the FCC predicted similar benefits in giving MMDS systems the
flexibility to operate on a noncommon carriage status.126
Prior to the MMDS Private Carriage Order, a number of FCC
decisions gave existing broadcasting licensees additional flexibility in using
their frequencies for nonbroadcast purposes. 27 In exercising that new
flexibility, the licensees were given the option of structuring their
nonbroadcast operations so as to be either noncommon carriers or common
carriers.'1 Licensees who held out their offerings to the public would
from James R. Keegan, FCC, to Joan M. Griffin, Contel Corp. (Aug. 2, 1990) (granting
noncommon carrier authority for an additional 8 transponders on each of the ASC-1 and
ASC-2 satellites and 30 of the 40 transponders on each of the Contelsat-1 and Contelsat-2
satellites); Letter from Chief, CC, FCC, to Ernest G. DeNigris, AT&T (Jan. 31, 1994)
(authorizing noncommon carrier service on an additional 25% of the available transponders
on TELSTAR 401 and 402).
124. See Application of Comsat General Corp. in File No. 42/43-DSS-ML/MISC-93, at
6-7 (Mar. 11, 1993); Application of GTE Spacenet Corp. in File No. 33-DSS-ML-93 (Jan.
13, 1993); Application of AT&T Corp. in File No. 1-DSS-ML-94, at 6-7 (Nov. 9, 1993).
125. MMDS Private Carriage Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 4251, para. 10 (1987).
126. Id. paras. 6-7.
127. See In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart F of the Comm'n's Rules to Permit
Shared Use of Brdcst. Auxiliary Facil's with Other Brdcst. and Nonbrdcst. Entities, Report
and Order, 93 F.C.C.2d 570 (1983) [hereinafter Broadcast Auxiliary Facility Sharing
Order]; In re Amendment of Parts 2 and 73 of the Comm'n's Rules Concerning Use of Sub-
sidiary Comm. Authorizations, First Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,445, 53 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1519 (1983) [hereinafter FM SCAs Order]; In re Amendment of Parts 2, 73 and
76 of the Comm'n's Rules to Authorize the Transmission of Teletext by TV Stations, Report
and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 27,054, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1309 (1983) (proceeding termi-
nated) [hereinafter Teletext Order], reconsidered, 101 F.C.C.2d 827 (1985) [hereinafter
Teletext Reconsideration]; In re Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 74 and 94 of the Comm'n's
Rules and Regs. in Regard to Frequency Allocation to the Instructional TV Fixed Service,
Report and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203 (1983) [hereinafter IFTS-MDS Reallocation Order],
reconsidered, 98 F.C.C.2d 129 (1984).
128. See Broadcast Auxiliary Facility Sharing Order, 93 F.C.C.2d paras. 25-26; FM
SCAs Order, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d 1526. 27 n.13; Teletext Order, 53 Rad. Reg. paras. 45, 61,
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then be subject to common carrier regulation. 29 However, the FCC did
not require the licensees to offer their services indiscriminately to the
public, in part because their new operations would take place in competitive
markets. '10
c. Private Land Mobile Services
During the same time period, the FCC considered the regulatory
status of private land mobile voice and paging services and found both
services to be noncommon carriage. In 1982, the FCC found that the
cooperative sharing of mobile voice telecommunications systems by multi-
ple licensees was not common carriage."' The FCC rejected the notion
that either the licensees or the entities which supplied equipment to the
licensees were common carriers.' Nothing in the record indicated that
the proposed licensees would "carry for all people indifferently" under
NARUC L'11 The FCC could not be expected to require the licensees in
this case to hold themselves out as common carriers; their licenses were
limited to providing communications service to a very small number of
entities. However, in the course of the proceeding, the FCC did make
public interest findings that such private licensing and shared use of
facilities were in the public interest. M
Since that decision, Congress has twice changed the Communications
Act's test for determining whether a particular mobile service is common
69; Teletext Reconsideration, 101 F.C.C.2d paras. 22-25; IFTS-MDS Reallocation Order,
94 F.C.C.2d paras. 123-29.
129. See Broadcast Auxiliary Facility Sharing Order, 93 F.C.C.2d para. 26; FM SCAs
Order, 53 Rad. Reg. para. 47; Teletext Order, 53 Rad. Reg. paras. 25-26; Teletext Recon-
sideration, 101 F.C.C.2d paras. 22-25; JFTS-MDS Reallocation Order, 94 F.C.C.2d paras.
123-130.
130. See, e.g., BroadcastAuxiliary Facility Sharing Order, 93 F.C.C.2d paras. 25-26.
See FM SCAs Order, 53 Rad. Reg. para. 27 (stating that it would evaluate each service
offered on an FM SCA in accordance with the relevant NARUC I or statutory test to deter-
mine whether the service is common carriage).
131. In re Amendment of Parts 89, 91, 93 and 95 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. to
Adopt New Practices and Procedures for Cooperative Use and Multiple Licensing of
Stations in the Private Land Mobile Radio Services, Report and Order, 89 F.C.C.2d 766,
paras. 24-25 (1982) [hereinafter Shared Facilities Order].
132. Id. As the FCC pointed out, equipment suppliers in this context are not even
providing communications services. Id. para. 24.
133. Id. para. 25. The FCC further found that neither the advertising of these shared
systems nor their interconnection with the public switched telephone network (PSTN)
altered the FCC's finding that the shared systems were not being used in a common carrier
fashion. Id. paras. 7, 26.
134. Id. paras. 26-50. The public interest determination included a discussion of whether
the third-party equipment suppliers would be allowed by this decision to engage in unfair
competition against the radio common carriers. Id. paras. 26-40.
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or private carriage. 5 Nonetheless, the FCC has ruled that private land
mobile voice and paging services were not common carriage.'
d. Private Microwave Services
The FCC broadly defined common carriage when reviewing a number
of microwave and fiber-optic cable activities in order to keep those services
outside the scope of common carriage and free from the jurisdiction of state
regulatory bodies. In 1985, the FCC freed private microwave licensees to
offer, on a for-profit basis, telecommunications services to other businesses
eligible to use these private frequencies. 7 This new freedom was calcu-
lated to foster additional capacity and increased usage of built capacity.'
Since the services would be offered on a very selective basis, these carriers
were distinguishable from common carriers.Y3 9 Because private licensees
would face incentives to select cautiously only users that were compatible
with a licensee's own existing use, the FCC found it unlikely that a li-
censee would hold itself out to the public. "
The FCC has found the proposed operation of a number of microwave
and fiber systems to be noncommon carriage.' 4' These cases are quite
135. The current provision enacted in response to pressure from cellular licensees'
concerns over their disparate treatment vis-A-vis SMRS carriers (NEXTEL, in particular)
is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)-(2). Under 47 U.S.C. § 331(c), all Commercial Mobile
Radio Service providers are to be subject to common carrier regulation, except that the
FCC may designate certain Title II provisions as inapplicable to particular services or
providers. In order to specify a provision of Title H as inapplicable, the FCC must find
that: (1) enforcement is not necessary in order to ensure just, reasonable, and nondiscrimi-
natory rates and practices; (2) enforcement is not necessary to protect consumers; and (3)
specifying such provision is in the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 331(c)(1)(A) (1988). The
FCC may not exempt carriers from complying with 47 U.S.C. § 201, 202, or 208. Id.
136. See In re Amendment of Parts 89, 91 and 93 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. to
Adopt New Practices and Procedures for Cooperative Use and Multiple Licensing of
Stations in the Private Land Mobile Radio Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Reconsideration, 93 F.C.C. 2d 1127, paras. 11-17 (1983); Amendments of Parts 2 and 22
of the Comm'n's Rules to Allocate Spectrum in the 928-941 MHz Band and to Establish
Other Rules, Policies, and Procedures for One-way Paging Stations in the Domestic Public
Land Mobile Radio Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 93
F.C.C.2d 908 (1983).
137. In re Amendment of Part 94 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. to Authorize Private
Carrier Systems in the Private Operational-Fixed Microwave Radio Service, First Report
and Order, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1486, para. 51 (1985) [hereinafter Private Microwave
Carrier Operations Order].
138. Id. paras. 50, 53-54, 68-70.
139. Id. paras. 53-57.
140. Id.
141. See In re Lightnet and Section 214 Application to Construct Fiber Optic System in
Florida as Part of an Interstate Network, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 182 (1985) [hereinafter Lightnet Order]; Norlight Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC
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similar in their application of NARUC I to the holding-out issue. Because
the operators of the proposed systems were under no legal compulsion to
hold their services out indiscriminately to the public,42 the FCC's inquiry
focused mainly on whether the system operators were likely to offer their
service to everyone. The FCC found in each case that the operators were
not likely to do so and emphasized the need for compatibility between the
operator's own internal use and the uses of the operator's customers. 43
The decisions also considered the competitive nature of the market
involved,'" while not placing much weight on the fact that some of the
operators had entered into contracts that contained similar terms," or the
relatively small use the operator itself made of its facilities."
e. Miscellaneous Common Carrier Cases
The FCC also has addressed the definition of common carriage in its
detariffing of inside wiring, 47 its deregulation of enhanced services and
CPE,' 48 and its declaratory ruling on FTS 2000.141 In the case of CPE,
the key issue was whether the equipment used to complete interstate
communications was itself a communications service required to be tariffed
by the Communications Act.5 The FCC narrowly construed the defini-
tion of communications service to justify its finding that the provision of
Rcd. 132, reconsidered 2 FCC Rcd. 5167 (1987); In re Public Serv. Co. of Oklahoma
Request for Declaratory Ruling, Declaratory Ruling, 3 FCC Rcd. 2327 (1988) [hereinafter
Public Serv. Co. Declaratory Ruling]; In re General Tel. Co. of the Southwest; Request for
Declaratory Ruling, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 3 FCC Rcd.
6778 (1988) [hereinafter General Tel. Co. Reconsideration].
142. See Lightnet Order, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) paras. 4, 8-10; Norlight Declaratory
Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd. para. 19.
143. See Lightnet Order, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) paras. 8-10; Norlight Declaratory
Ruling, 2 FCC. Rcd. para. 19; reconsidered, 2 FCC Rcd. para. 14; Public Serv. Co.
Declaratory Ruling, 3 FCC Rcd. para. 18; General Tel. Co. Reconsideration, 3 FCC Rcd.
para. 9.
144. See Lightnet Declaratory Ruling, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) paras. 6-7; Norlight
Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd. paras. 22-23.
145. See Norlight Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd. paras. 22-23; General Tel. Co.
Declaratory Ruling, 3 FCC Rcd. para. 10.
146. See Norlight Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd. paras. 22-23.
147. Inside Wiring Second Report and Order, 51 Fed. Reg. 8498, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1143 (1986).
148. Computer 11 FCC Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980); In re Amendment of
Section 64.702 of the Commn's Rules and Regs. (Second Computer Inquiry), Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980).
149. In re General Services Administration; Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding
FTS 2000 Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5072 (1987) [hereinafter
General Services Administration Order]. FTS 2000 is the custom-designed integrated inter-
city service telecommunications network for the federal government.
150. Computer H FCC Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d paras. 168-179.
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CPE is not a common carrier service, stating the fact that "some carriers
have traditionally furnished [CPE] with their communications services does
not establish that they are required to do so or warrant any universal
inferences about the public interest."15 The FCC went on to note, and
to rely upon, the competitive benefits which were to flow from the
detariffing of CPE.' 2
In regard to Computer Irs detariffing of enhanced services, the FCC
reiterated its decision to refrain from requiring providers of enhanced
services to offer these services indiscriminately to the public.," The FCC
also found that customer services and individualized decisions were
"[i]nherent in the offering of enhanced services.' In detariffing inside
wiring, the FCC relied on the same legal authority it had used in the
Computer II FCC Final Decision."'s
The FCC avoided addressing the issue of whether a provision of FTS
2000 would or could be considered private carriage, in light of the fact that
the parameters of FTS 2000 were yet to be determined. 6 The General
Services Administration argued that FTS 2000 should be considered private
carriage because the General Services Administration could "fend for
itself" due to the existence of effective competition among potential pro-
viders. However, the FCC declined to use this as a basis for declaring FTS
2000 to be a common carrier service before the service was outlined.1
7
The FCC made clear that it was not rejecting the possibility that a carrier
is not engaged in common carriage when it offers a service that is subject
to effective competition. 5 The FCC stated that this proposition remained
an open question.159
151. id. para. 171.
152. Id. para. 183.
153. Id. paras. 122-23. The FCC stated that such a requirement "would negate the
dynamics of computer technology" and preclude vendors from tailoring services to fit a
customer's needs. In contrast, the FCC recently required AT&T to offer its InterSpar frame
relay service-a data transmission service-indiscriminately to the public. This was done
to strengthen the competing enhanced service providers and, probably, was due to
bureaucratic impulses regarding the FCC's definitions of basic and enhanced services. See
In re Indep. Data Comm. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T's
Interspan Frame Relay Serv. Is a Basic Serv., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC
Rcd. 13,717 (1995).
154. Computer II FCC Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d para. 123.
155. Inside Wiring Second Report and Order, 51 Rad. Reg. 1143, para. 2 (1986).
156. See General Services Administration Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5072, para. 30 (1987).
157. Id. para. 32.
158. Id. at 5077 n.24.
159. Id.
[Vol. 48
THE PRIVATE CARRIER ALTERNATIVE
E. The Contract Service Proposal
In the 1XC Competition NPRM, the FCC proposed to allow AT&T
and other long-distance carriers to provide contract services as private
carriage."6t The proposal as applied to AT&T was limited in terms of
quantity and also would have required that AT&T gain Section 214 authori-
ty' prior to withdrawing specific facilities or a portion of its facilities
from common carriage. The IXC Competition NPRM proposal also
would provide that no customer would be forced to accept private carriage
in lieu of common carriage."6
The FCC noted that it had significant leeway in determining whether
an offering should be subjected to common carrier regulation." Based
on NARUC I and its progeny, the FCC tentatively concluded that it did
have authority to permit long-distance companies to offer service on a
private carriage basis."
Not surprisingly, many of AT&T's competitors opposed the proposal.
Many commenters claimed that adoption of the proposal would be too
dramatic a move for the FCC. Sprint argued that cost accounting issues
relating to joint and common costs precluded adoption of the proposal. 67
160. 1XC Competition NPRM, 5 FCC Rcd. 2644, para. 142 (1990).
161. 47 U.S.C. § 214 requires that the FCC determine that an interstate common
carrier's extension or withdrawal from service is in the public convenience and necessity.
This section purports to protect the public from "goldplating"-a carrier's padding of the
rate base through provision of unnecessary facilities-and from loss of necessary service in
the event of a withdrawal from service. As the XC Competition NPRM points out, AT&T
was the only long-distance carrier subject to Section 214 approval. Id. at 2657 n.184.
162. Id. para. 142.
163. Id. at 2657 n.186. It is unclear how the FCC would have enforced useful price
restrictions to protect against the possibility that AT&T could "force" large customers into
private carriage by raising its common carrier rates vis-A-vis its private carriage rates. If
private carriage were to be more efficient, it is likely, or at least proper, that private car-
riage contracts would be lower priced (adjusted for quality) than common carriage tariffed
offerings.
164. Id. para. 149.
165. Id. As in many cases, the driving force behind the FCC's desires to explore such
an option was the existence of competition in the market at issue. See id. para. 151.
166. See Williams Telecommunications' Comments at 10, 21; Sprint's Comments at 180;
IDCMA's Comments at 102; Comptel's Comments at Appendix, page 39. In addition, the
Department of Justice and the National Telecommunications Infrastructure Administration
(NTIA) argued that the proposal required further study. See Department of Justice's
Comments at 48; NTIA's Comments at 25. In this footnote and throughout this Article,
comments filed in response to the 1XC Competition NPRM will be cited simply as "[party's
name]'s Comments".
167. See Sprint's Comments at 171.
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Comptel argued that private carriage would permit rate de-averaging.'1
Williams argued that Maislin Industries69 and the "filed-rate doctrine"
required that AT&T charge only the rate filed in its tariffs and not any
privately negotiated rate. 7 A number of commenters also read General
Services Administration to preclude private carriage in this instance.'
When the FCC issued the IXC Competition Order, it made no mention
of the private carriage proposal, except to state in a footnote that "(t]he
record does not support the adoption of our private carriage proposal at this
time.""'2 Commissioner Duggan applauded the FCC's decision "pointedly
declin[ing] to adopt some of the more far-reaching proposals," including
the private carriage proposal.'
The remainder of this Article considers the contract service segment
in today's long-distance market and whether allowing carriers to enter into
private carriage contracts would square with the NARUC I test. 74
168. See Comptel's Comments at 150.
169. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990). In Maislin
Industries, the Supreme Court affirmed the "filed-rate doctrine" which precludes a carrier
that has filed tariffs from charging any rate other than the one specified in the tariffs. Id.
at 119.
170. See Williams Telecommunications' Comments at 24. Cf. NATA's Comments at 35
(arguing that private carriage is not permitted where the same class of service is regulated
under common carriage).
171. See Williams Telecommunications' Comments at 17; Sprint's Comments at 145;
Comptel's Comments at Appendix, 36.
172. IXC Competition Order, 6 FCC Rcd.o5880, 5897 n.150 (1990).
173. Id. at 5917 (Separate Statement of E. Duggan, Comm'r) (noting that throughout its
history, the FCC has scrupulously avoided moving too quickly on any given matter).
174. It also should be noted that the FCC proposed to make so-called local exchange
carrier's (LEC) special construction activities, currently under tariff, noncommon carriage.
In re Special Constr. of Lines and Special Serv. Arrangements Provided by Common Carri-
ers, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 97 F.C.C.2d 978 (1984). The NPRM argued that
LECs might not be compelled to offer special construction services on a common carrier
basis due to competition in the market and due to efficiencies of individualized offerings.
The NPRM also argued that the special construction services were not necessarily indis-
criminate offerings, again due to individualized dealings. See id. See also Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting a contradiction between
FCC's arguments in the NPRM and the FCC's policies regarding provision of dark fiber
by common carriers).
This proposal, insofar as it antedated price cap regulation and covered dominant
carriers, raised difficult questions of potential cross-subsidy as well as definitional problems.
In addition, the local market is usually considered less competitive than the interexchange
market. Because of the potential for cross-subsidy, the Commission sought to limit the scope
of the change to services involving discrete facilities. The NPRM was never decided; it was
dismissed six years later because the record had become "stale." See In re Special Constr.
of Lines and Special Serv. Arrangements Provided by Common Carriers, Order, 5 FCC
Rcd. 5410 (1990).
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II. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF CUSTOMER-SPECIFIC
CONTRACTS
Many customers view specialized telecommunications services as an
important part of their business operations. Individually negotiated contracts
are often viewed by these customers as the best way to get these tailored
services at the lowest price. Such negotiations allow large customers, at
least, to leverage price and quality, competition when dealing with their
long-distance carrier. 75 This desire, on the part of customers is not new.
In Above 890, the FCC noted that private users' control over their own
private microwave networks allowed for customization, better control, and
greater flexibility in meeting their own communications needs. 76
More often than not, customers prefer to keep their telecommunica-
tions contracts and the negotiations secret, in order to protect proprietary
information. However, tariff filing requirements, by definition, make
certain terms, conditions, and prices public information. 77
The contract business represents an important and dynamic segment
of the long-distance market. Major interexchange carriers compete with
data communications companies, computer system vendors, and systems
integrators in the rapidly growing market for solving customers' infor-
mation needs. 7 These customers require individualized attention;
"individual firms bring entirely different motivations and expectations to
the table." 79
Unfortunately, FCC regulation has stymied development of this
segment, left customer demand unsatisfied, and produced regulatory
anomalies and failures. The FCC has construed the Communications Act
175. Some customers use more than one long-distance carrier and have individually
negotiated contracts with each of them.
176. Above 890 Order, 27 F.C.C. 359, paras. 24-27 (1959). By tightly negotiating
contract carriage, a large user can often gain the same benefits it would receive from oper-
ating its own private network. By doing so, a large user can avoid being forced to provide
that carriage service for itself.
177. See 47 C.F.R. § 61.55 (1995); 1XC Competition Order, 6 FCC Rcd. para. 122.
178. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Evaluating Network Outsourcing Vendors, Bus. COM.
REv., Aug. 1995, at 48-50.
179. F. Warren McFarlan & Richard L. Nolan, How to Manage an Outsourcing
Alliance, SLOAN MGMT. REv., Winter 1995, at 9, 20. MCI's award from the Smithsonian
Institution was as a result of its "use of advanced technology in delivering customized solu-
tions for customers." Outsourcing: How Industry Leaders Are Reshaping the American
Corporation, at 7, in FORTUNE (special advertising section), Oct. 16, 1995 (emphasis add-
ed). Tom Richardson, a system integrator, counsels firms and network outsourcing partners
to spend "plenty of upfront time togethe." working out the details of their network
solutions. Tom Richardson, ProjectManagment Pitfalls, Bus. COM. REV., Aug. 1995, at
49.
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in a way that limits the usefulness of common carrier-tariffed contracts.
Tariffs 12 and 15 are good examples of this, as are common carrier
contracts. Although they offer greater flexibility, the requirement that they
be offered to all similarly situated customers mitigates their ability to allow
for truly tailored, innovative deals.
Many customers have argued in favor of customer-specific contracts,
with the ability to treat the negotiations and contracts as proprietary
information."8 This demonstrated interest in customer-specific contracts,
coupled with the presence of significant competition, at least in the high-
volume interexchange market, provides support for treating these customer-
specific contracts as private carriage.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PRIVATE CARRIER ALTERNATIVE TO
CUSTOMER CONTRACTS
Any removal of a service from common carrier regulation must
satisfy the NARUC I test.' Telecommunications contracts present no
exception. However, nothing in the nature of these contracts or the services
provided thereunder requires that they be designated as common carrier
services. Furthermore, there is little reason for the FCC to require that
carriers continue to hold these contract services out indiscriminately to the
public.
A. Telecommunications Contracts Are the Reverse Image of the
Generally Available Offerings Envisioned Under Common
Carriage
Contract offerings are tailored to a customer's specific needs and offer
pricing based on a customer's unique situation. While differences in calling
patterns among small users may be slight, the telecommunications needs of
very large users (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange and General Electric)
often vary greatly, in terms of services, usage, and the cost to provide ser-
vice. New technologies may make these differences even larger, as each
customer chooses the particular innovations which suit its needs. If
allowed, a carrier could and would package service elements and price
these packages on individual terms.
Another aspect of these consumer-specific contracts is that they are
generally long-term arrangements. A number of cases has pointed out that
longer term offerings can be a distinguishing feature of private carriage,
180. See IXC Competition Order, 6 FCC Rcd. para. 118. Many customers objected to
an FCC proposal that entire contracts be filed. Id.
181. See discussion of NARUC I supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
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perhaps because smaller and less sophisticated users cannot forecast ad
commit to a particular offering for a relatively long period of time.18
Smaller customers also may present more risk in a long-term deal to a
long-distance carrier and provide less of an incentive for the carrier to
tailor its offering to minimize those risks.
For a number of reasons, AT&T's competitors have argued that
common carrier contracts and contracts under Tariffs 12 and 15 were not
generally available." To the extent that these competitors are correct,
these offerings cannot, afortiori, meet the NARUC I test. In any case, the
contract tariffs are made generally available only after they have been
individually negotiated, due to regulatory compulsion. In the absence of
regulatory compulsion, these individually negotiated deals constitute private
offerings.
Although many common carrier contracts contain similar or identical
terms, the FCC has rejected the existence of similar terms as part of the
common carrier criteria." At this stage, the private carriage proposal
would include only large contracts, subject to individual negotiation. Large
common carrier contracts are currently the subject of intense individualized
negotiations. If the private carriage proposal is adopted, the contracts could
be subject to even greater negotiation."
Services characterized by specialized, customer-specific offerings and
individual negotiations will not, at least in the absence of a legal compul-
sion, be held out indiscriminately to the public. There is nothing in the
nature of unregulated contract carriage to cause the FCC to expect that it
would be common carriage under NARUC L
182. Larger users usually negotiate flexibility into their contracts.
183. See, e.g., In re AT&T Comm. Apparent Liability for Forfeiture and Order to Show
Cause, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture and Order to Show Cause, 10 FCC Rcd.
1664 (1995) (AT&T apparently violated the Communications Act by failing to provide
requested service under Contract Tariff F.C.C. No. 383.); Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n
v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding FCC determination that certain Tariff
12 offerings'were not unreasonably discriminatory); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 917
F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (remanding FCC approval of AT&T Tariff 12 offerings after
FCC committed "legal seppuku" in finding services unlike when considering pricing
differences).
184. See, e.g., NorlightDeclaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd. 132, para. 23 (1987); General
Tel. Co. Reconsideration, 3 FCC Rcd. 6778, paras. 10-11 (1988). In most industries, con-
tracts have a substantial amount of similar terms, sometimes involving identical agreements
and often involving preprinted forms.
185. Because an interexchange carrier knows that it must make any individually-
negotiated contract available to the public generally, it is less likely to negotiate a deal that
takes into account specific attributes of the customer, for fear that it will have to provide
the same price and terms to a customer without those special attributes.
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B. Public Interest Does Not Require Any Long-Distance Carrier
to Indiscriminately Hold Out Its Contract Service Offerings to
the Public
In addition to there being no evidence that telecommunications
carriers would, absent regulatory compulsion, hold out their contract
service offerings to the public, there is no public interest need for or
advantage in imposing such a requirement on carriers.
1. Competition Minimizes the Likelihood of Anticompetitive
Conduct
The long-distance market is now substantially competitive, and no
long-distance carrier can unilaterally control price, as demonstrated by
recent FCC analysis. The FCC analyzed the competitive conditions in the
long-distance market when it ruled on AT&T's request to be classified as
a nondominant carrier."S The FCC concluded that AT&T is nondominant
because it no longer has market power in the relevant market."s In so
doing, the FCC freed AT&T from price cap regulation for its domestic
services."z AT&T may now file tariffs with one day's notice, without
cost-support data, and with a presumption of lawfulness. 89 AT&T is also
relieved of special reporting requirements and Section 214 obligations."
The FCC's conclusion that AT&T lacks market power in the relevant
market rests on three essential findings. First, the relevant product and
geographic market is the interstate, domestic interexchange telecommunica-
tions market.' The FCC defined the relevant market broadly because the
interexchange facilities used to provide the various business and residential
services are largely fungible."g
Second, AT&T's competitors have sufficient existing ability to supply
services and ability to supply more services to constrain AT&T's unilateral
pricing decisions."9 For example, the FCC found uncontroverted evi-
dence that "MCI and Sprint alone can absorb overnight as much as fifteen
percent of AT&T's total 1993 switched demand at no incremental capacity
cost; that within 90 days MCI, Sprint, and LDDS/WilTel, using their
186. AT&T Nondominance Order, FCC 95-427, paras. 19-34 (Oct. 23, 1995).
187. Id. para. 35.
188. Id. para. 12.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. para. 21.
192. 1d. para. 23.
193. Id. para. 58.
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existing equipment, could absorb almost one-third of AT&T's total
switched capacity .... "194
Third, the FCC found that even residential long-distance customers
are willing to switch from AT&T to obtain price reductions and other
desired features. 19 The FCC also relied on its finding in 1XC Competition
Order that business customers were highly demand elastic." Among
other things, business customers are more sophisticated than residential
customers and often rely on consultants and in-house telecommunications
experts. The FCC noted that in 1994 AT&T supplied only 25.6 percent of
the approximately $4.4 billion resale market."9 The FCC concluded that
any ability AT&T had to control price is confined to de minimis segments
of the overall market and that "most major segments of the interexchange
market are subject to substantial competition today, and the vast majority
of interexchange services and transactions are subject to substantial compe-
tition. "198
2. Solving the Difficulty in Allocating Joint and Common Costs
Does Not Require Common Carrier Regulation
The lack of rate-of-return regulation also minimizes the cost-allocation
problems associated with costs incurred jointly in the provision of both
common and private carriage. While the problems of allocation of joint and
common costs still exist, they are no longer very important and can be left
to the market. Furthermore, neither NARUC I nor its predecessors require
the use of separate facilities when an entity provides both common and pri-
vate carriage.'
The existence of discrete facilities is neither essential to the analysis
of whether a carrier is in fact holding out a particular service to the public
nor important in determining whether a carrier has sufficient market power
to be required to offer the service indiscriminately. To the extent the FCC
has found that the contract carriage segment of the long-distance market or
the long-distance market itself is competitive, then it should acknowledge
194. Id. para. 59.
195. Id. para. 63.
196. Id. para. 65 (noting that the FCC had previously found that long-distance business'
services, except analog private line, and 800 services, except 800 directory assistance, had
become substantially competitive). See MXC Competition Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, para.
37 (1991).
197. AT&T Nondominance Order, FCC 95-427, para. 65 (Oct. 23, 1995).
198. Id. para. 26.
199. For example, resellers can be classified as common carriers even though they do
not own any facilities. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
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that carriers have an incentive to allocate joint and common costs reason-
ably.
Any cost-allocation problems associated with long-distance telephony
are no different and possibly of a lesser degree than those presented by the
issue of transponder sales." The Wld Communications court was un-
troubled by the prospect that the same satellite could contain both common
carrier and noncommon carrier transponders. 20
3. Geographic Rate Averaging Law and Policy Do Not Preclude
the Private Carriage Proposal
Although, presumably, private carriage would involve some amount
of geographic de-averaging of rates, neither law nor policy precludes large
business long-distance services such as Tariff 12 and contract services from
being provided on this basis.' A properly constructed private carriage
proposal should be no different. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
requires interexchange service providers to charge rates that are no higher
in rural areas than in urban areas or in one state than in any other
state. 3 The legislative history of this provision clarifies that the de-
averaging that occurs under Tariff 12-type services is permissible, and
other limited extensions could be authorized.' The evidence and prior
FCC decisions support the view that customer-specific services for large
customers have not undercut geographic rate averaging. The FCC has
found that allowing AT&T to offer common carrier contracts would not
adversely affect residential customers or jeopardize geographic rate
averaging.' As a threat to geographic averaged rates, the private car-
riage approach differs in no important regard from existing large customer
services. In practice, like Tariff 12 and common carrier contract services,
it would be limited to those relatively few customers willing to negotiate
individual deals.
200. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
201. See discussion of Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC supra notes 97-108 and
accompanying text.
202. See JXC Competition Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, paras. 52-59 (1991) (stating that
allowing AT&T to offer common carrier contracts will not adversely affect residential
customers).
203. 142 CONG. REc. H1112 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996).
204. Id.
205. 1XC Competition Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, paras. 114, 116 (1991).
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C. The Private Carrier Alternative Is Consistent with
Deregulatory Approach of the Telecommunications Act of
1996
Apart from concerns about maintaining geographic averaging of long-
distance rates, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides added support
for the private carrier alternative. As discussed earlier, the definitions of
"telecommunications services" and "telecommunications carriers" in the
new law maintain and extend the distinction between common and private
carriage.' The statute also strengthens the competition rationale relating
to competition that the FCC has used in determining which markets and
carriers need not be compelled to make their services available to the
public generally.' Not surprisingly, the FCC's first proposed use of its
Section 401(a) forbearance authority is to forbear from enforcing 47
U.S.C. § 203, which requires common carriers to file tariffs.3 8 In the
1996 Detariffing NPRM, the FCC notes its previous finding that the de-
tariffing of nondominant carriers will promote the introduction of new
services and foster more robust price competition.' The FCC also
restates its belief that in competitive markets, rational carriers will not
engage in unreasonable price discrimination. 10 The elimination of tariffs
would also eliminate the ability of carriers to escape contract requirements
by filing tariff changes under the filed rate doctrine.211
There are important differences in rationale and likely use that make
forbearance and private carriage complementary but distinct means of
deregulating telecommunications services. Most fundamentally, private car-
riage necessarily makes a clean break with the public availability require-
ments of common carriage. For example, in the 1996 Detariffing NPRM,
the FCC does not propose to relieve long-distance carriers of any of their
Title II obligations other than Section 203's tariffing requirements. The
carriers' rates must continue to be generally available and reasonable both
in amount and across similarly-situated customers." 2 Carriers would still
be required to keep the information previously available in tariffs on hand
206. See discussion supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 401, 100 Stat. 128.
208. See 1996 Detariffing NPRM in CC Dkt. 96-61, FCC 96-123 (Mar. 25, 1996).
209. Id. para. 21.
210. Id. para. 28.
211. Id. paras. 92-101. The 1996 Detariffing NPRM provides a more in-depth
examination of the filed rate doctrine. Briefly, the filed rate doctrine requires and, thus,
allows carriers to charge the rate specified in their tariffs, even if they conflict with
negotiated contract rates.
212. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (1988).
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for FCC inspection2 3 and would be subject to complaint processes.1 4
While such a limited approach may be reasonable given the history of
the FCC's forbearance policy and the record compiled in its earlier
proceedings, the approach remains fundamentally different from the private
carrier alternative that makes true customer-specific contracts possible. The
terms of a private carrier contract could be proprietary and truly unique to
an individual customer. Any complaints a customer or a carrier might have
would be resolved not by the FCC, but through negotiation, arbitration, or
court action-just as other commercial contracts are resolved. These
features of private carrier contracts would permit more tailoring of service
features and prices to reflect the circumstances at the time the contract is
negotiated. On the other hand, the publicly available "telecommunications
services" which are subject to forbearance by the FCC are in large part
mass market or at least more-than-one-customer market services. Total
forbearance from regulation of both types of service is not going to happen
any time soon. As a theoretical matter, there is no pressing need to discard
the common/private carrier distinction which has evolved over time and
recognizes the fundamental difference between the types of services.
As discussed below in Part III.E., private carrier contracts could
foster more robust price competition and eliminate the dampening effect
that tariffs may have on competition. In addition, the proprietary and
customer-specific nature of private carrier contracts would promote
competition to a greater degree than mere detariffing.
The combined use of forbearance and private carriage may be
optimal. Under the Communications Act and at common law, carriers use
tariffs to reduce the transaction costs associated with their commercial
relationships with customers. For example, carriers use tariffs to limit their
liability for consequential damages arising out of the failure of their
networks. In a competitive market, carriers are expected to compete on all
aspects of service, including the terms of carriage as well as price and
quality. Such limitations on liability, however, may achieve an efficient
distribution of risks. Efficiencies can result where a limitation on conse-
quential damages decreases a carrier's costs through reductions in liability
costs215 and produces price reductions that consumers find more attractive
than an alternative service offering that allows customers to recover for
consequential damages. In the small customer segment of the market where
the costs of negotiations or even contract execution are most significant,
213. 1996 Detariffing NPRM in CC Dkt. 96-61, FCC 96-123 para. 36.
214. Id. para. 28.
215. Greater liability exposure also could cause inefficiently high levels of quality as
carriers seek to minimize losses from such liability.
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tariffs may be the cheapest means of effecting this distribution of risks.
Coupled with permissive detariffing, the private carrier alternative
would maintain most of the benefits of mandatory detariffing while still
allowing for the efficiencies of tariffs. Those large customers that actually
want to negotiate for customized terms could thereby avoid carriers'
attempts to unilaterally alter negotiated terms. The availability of private
carrier contracts would undercut the ability of carriers to use tariff filings
to help enforce or signal price understandings because the private deals
would be negotiated in secret and could be subject to nondisclosure agree-
ments. Because these deals could be reached with resellers, their effects
could extend beyond the very large customer market to the mass market.
D. Should the FCC Desire to Limit the Extent of Private
Carriage, There Are Many Ways to Accomplish that Goal
If the FCC is concerned about making too dramatic a change, there
are many options for limiting the amount and scope of services to be
offered under a private carriage alternative. To begin with, the FCC could
define private carriage as including only individually negotiated contracts.
By requiring that all private contracts be individually negotiated, the FCC
would ensure that most of the long-distance market, including those servic-
es used by residential and small business customers, would remain
"protected" by common carrier regulation. Customers could still decide to
take their service from a tariffed offering, but adopting a private carriage
approach would give some customers the ability to gain more customer-
specific services that would make services closer to actual cost.
As the FCC proposed in 1XC Competition NPRM, the amount of
private carriage service could be limited to a percentage of a carrier's reve-
nues.216 Although such a market division could be seen as anticom-
petitive, the FCC could relate the percentage of private carriage to the size
of the contract carriage market.
As a further limitation, a private carriage proposal adopted by the
FCC would almost certainly be limited to interstate long-distance service.
Thus, state regulators could continue to monitor and regulate intrastate con-
tract services as common carriage if the state commissions felt that such
regulation was necessary to protect individual competitors or customers.
In order to ensure that any experiment with private carriage did not
run amok, the FCC could require all long-distance carriers to report their
private carrier activities. The FCC and long-distance competitors could
then monitor developments to assure that NARUC I and any other require-
216. See JXC Competition NPRM, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, para. 142 (1990).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
ments were met. These limitations and reporting requirements would allow
the FCC to experiment with private carriage. If such experimentation
proved successful, the FCC might consider doing away with any percentage
or reporting requirements, once it was comfortable with long-distance
contracts being provided on a private carriage basis.
A limited approach follows from the guidance of Wold Communica-
tions. 7 First, the FCC could find that the long-distance market is effec-
tively competitive." 8 Second, continuing common carrier regulation of
the noncontract portion of the market would provide an added safeguard for
all customers. While the Wold Communications court deferred to the FCC's
analysis of whether satellite operators would be able to charge monopoly
prices,219 it still placed a good deal of emphasis on the continuing avail-
ability of transponders under common carriage.' At the least, the
measured step of a limited private carriage alternative could be taken by the
FCC.
E. Public Benefits of Private Carriage
As mentioned above,' private carriage would give carriers the
flexibility to customize deals. The definitional approach of limiting private
carriage to individually negotiated contracts solves the FCC's putative legal
problem with Tariff 15 on the grounds that it is not generally available as
required by Title 11.m Title II ironically requires a finding that the
carrier is not holding out this particular offering indiscriminately to the
217. The court's analysis in Wold Communications consisted of three key factors. First,
the FCC continued to exercise Title II authority with respect to the large majority of tran-
sponders. Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Second, the authorization was not blanket. The FCC stated that it would, in reviewing an
application required under Title II, determine whether sufficient common carrier tran-
sponder capacity would remain if an application was granted. Id. In so doing, the court
found that the FCC's reluctance to establish a bright line test for the appropriate percentage
to be reasonable because a simple comparison of percentages of transponders in and outside
of common carriage might not be appropriate in every case. Id. at 1476. Third, the FCC
committed to monitor the situation and to revise its course if changing circumstances war-
ranted. The court emphasized that "[the FCC] has not forsworn regulation or slighted its
obligation to forecast where the public interest lies; and it stands ready to alter its course
if future developments indicate that the public interest is not advanced by its decision." Id.
at 1475. The FCC could make the same declarations in adopting a private carriage alterna-
tive.
218. As noted supra note 113, domestic satellite carriers still were regulated as dominant
carriers at the time of the Transponder Sales Order.
219. Wold Communications, Inc., 735 F.2d at 1477-79.
220. Id. at 1468.
221. See supra Part rII.A.
222. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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public.
The FCC would encourage more robust price competition by allowing
private carriage. As the FCC pointed out in the IXC Competition NPRM,
private carriage would eliminate "[o]ne of the basic prerequisites" for
pricing above competitive levels or other restrictions on competition:
knowledge of a competitor's prices.' Such knowledge facilitates
agreements and tacit collusion among competitors.' As the Supreme
Court stated, "[u]ncertainty is an oligopoly's greatest enemy."' Scherer
and Ross explain:
When many sellers attempt to capture orders through sub-rosa
price cuts, monopolistic price structures tend to collapse. If, on
the other hand, every transaction is publicized immediately, all
members of the industry will know when one has made a price
cut, and each can retaliate on the next transaction. Knowledge
that retaliation will be swift serves as a powerful deterrent to
price cutting and therefore facilitates the maintenance of tacitly
collusive prices.'
Supreme Court cases going as far back as 1921 have noted the importance
of price information in facilitating collusive behavior.m
223. XC Competition NPRM, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, para. 143 (1990).
224. See id.
225. Brook Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2596, reh'g de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 13 (1993). Prof. Phillip Areeda concurs:
Tacit coordination is obstructed by any characteristics of the product, the
sellers, the buyers, or the transactions that reduce each seller's confidence
in predicting or monitoring rivals' present or future behavior. Such un-
certainty stands in the way of oligopolists' achieving cartel-like results
through recognized interdependence.
PHILLIP AREEDA, 6 ANTITRUST LAW 1435 (1986).
226. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 348. Scherer and Ross point out that, in 1912,
corporate attorney Arthur Jerome Eddy promoted open pricing in order to facilitate price
collusion and prevent "ruinous competition." See id. (quoting ARTHUR JEROME EDDY, THE
NEw COMPETrION 126 (4th ed. 1917)).
227. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410 (1921)
(manufacturer's association's requirement that members submit price lists and sales reports
to the association, which the association reported, reflected agreement to follow a common
purpose); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (manufacturer's
association requirements that members report details of business for dissemination to other
members); Sugar Institute v. United States, 287 U.S. 553, 598 (1936) (violation found
where 15 sugar refining companies explicitly agreed to charge quoted prices without devia-
tion until publicly announced changes were made); United States v. Container Corp. of
Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (the provision of prices quoted to particular customers to
competitors tended to stabilize prices illegally). Where general price and factor cost
information was reported without other evidence of implied agreement on prices or a re-
quirement to charge such prices, the Supreme Court has not found violations. See Maple
Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925) (no violation where
association gathered and disseminated information without evidence of agreement with
respect to prices or other concerted behavior); Cement Mfrs.' Protective Ass'n v. United
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Recognizing the anticompetitive effects of tariff requirements would
not involve a change of course for the FCC. At least when applied to
nondominant carriers, the FCC noted that tariff regulation is "counterpro-
ductive, since it can inhibit price competition, service innovation, entry into
the market, and the ability of carriers to respond quickly to market
trends."' The FCC also stated that tariff filings "can impede entry,
impair competitive pricing, and facilitate collusive conduct."'" The FCC
stated that the benefit of forbearance instead of streamlined regulation was
the lack of required price and condition disclosure by carriers to their com-
petitors, eliminating "a potential vehicle for collusive conduct and facili-
tat[ing] price discounting. "23
While the FCC found the record evidence inconclusive as to the
presence of tacit price coordination among AT&T, MCI, and Sprint with
respect to basic rates, it concluded that to the extent this problem exists it
would be "better addressed by removing regulatory requirements that may
facilitate such conduct, such as the longer advance notice period [then]
currently applicable only to AT&T" and by possible industry-wide
regulatory changes.A31
In addition, nontariffed private carriage can create a breeding ground
for innovative communications applications. A long-distance company
States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (no violation where association gathered and disseminated
information without evidence of agreement with respect to prices or other concerted
behavior).
228. In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Nondominant Common Carriers, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 6752, para. 2 (1993).
229. In re Policies and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Services and
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C. 2d 554, 554 n.1
(1983) (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 457 (1978).
"[The exchange of price information among competitors carries with it the added potential
for the development of concerted price-fixing arrangements which lie at the core of the
Sherman Act's prohibitions.").
230. Id. at 556 n.3.
231. AT&T Nondominance Order, FCC 95-427, para. 83 (Oct. 23, 1995). The AT&T
Nondominance Order abolished the advance notice requirement. Id. para. 83. AT&T did
commit for one year to give 5 days advance notice to customers in existing term plans and
to give 14 days notice if service is to be discontinued. Id. para. 135. The advance notice
requirement can aid in cooperative price understandings among competitors, making "price
leadership" less risky, because the "leader" can retract its price increase if it does not get
enough "followers." See AREEDA, supra note 225, at 222. In the absence of price leader-
ship, advance notice requirements still undermine the incentive for a firm to offer innovative
pricing or marketing packages because its competitors have ample time to respond by
constructing similar offerings. The would-be innovator, thus, loses any first-mover advan-
tage it might have otherwise had. See XC Competition, Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, para. 80
(1991) (recognizing that notice requirements can discourage AT&T from being the first
mover in the market and encourage AT&T's competitors to be reactors).
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would be more inclined to work with a large user in developing new
applications if it were not faced with the risk that a money-losing
experiment might have to be repeated with any other user requesting the
same arrangement. Both the long-distance company and the customer would
be more likely to share and make use of proprietary information when they
can be better assured of nondisclosure. Private carriage would give carriers
more freedom to respond quickly to market developments without fear of
disclosing information to competitors.
Additionally, the long-distance carriers would be encouraged to work
with their customers to find cost-saving measures that the customer could
take, and the customers would face incentives to implement them. Under
common carrier regulation, the long-distance company would not fully
adjust its price for the cost of serving any individual customer because it
would risk having to provide that lower price to customers who did not
share the same cost characteristics.
Abuse of the tariff process would be curtailed as well. Competitors
could focus their energies on meeting their competition in the marketplace,
rather than in tariff investigations. As 1XC Competition NPRM pointed out,
protection against anticompetitive conduct would be available in the form
of antitrust remedies." Because the FCC could limit the provision of
service under private contract to those entities which can "take care of
themselves" in the marketplace, the FCC could continue to protect those
customers it deems unable to protect themselves.233
Lastly, the private carriage proposal would result in substantial
administrative savings in terms of both FCC resources and the administra-
tive costs visited on the carriers and customers in complying with the
common carrier requirements.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with NARUC 1, any common carrier offering services in
the contract segment of the long-distance market and holding itself out to
the public indiscriminately could be given the option to act as a private
carrier. This approach would be similar to that taken by the FCC in allow-
ing sales of transponders on satellites that were also engaged in common
carriage. Initially, the FCC might place additional limits on the use of this
232. See XC Competition NPRM, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, 2658 n.187 (1990).
233. Customer sophistication is not determinative of whether a service must be classified
as private or common carriage. See General Services Administration Order, 2 FCC Rcd.
5072, para. 29 (1987). However, the public interest determination is certainly affected by
whether the regulatory restraints actually protect a customer better than the customer could
protect itself.
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option, such as limiting it to a fixed percentage of a carrier's business. This
would allow the FCC to evaluate whether such an approach should be
continued or extended.
The private carriage approach is not limited by explicit provisions of
the statute and is consistent with extensive court precedent affording the
FCC discretion in this area. Private carrier services need not comply with
the requirements of Title II, eliminating the need for cost showings, tariff
filings, showings of general availability, nondiscrimination, or justice and
reasonableness. In the current competitive environment this option could
do no harm and would foster more robust price competition and innovation,
provide substantial cost savings, and remove unnecessary government
intrusion into the private sector.
